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If one claims to have knowledge based upon a reli
gious experience, must they belong to a specific religion to
have that experience? More importantly, must they have
participated directly in that experience? These experiences
may be an entirely normal human phenomenon, given that
most have an understanding of a divine presence" or even
"participation" in such an event) However, something so
widely understood as religious experience" falls short
when a definition must be ascribed to it. Some may contend
that a "religious" experience does not imply its origin in
doctrinal or institutional religion.ii On the other hand, those
that cling to religion often find that religion would be de
prived (in most cases) of its most basic element if it did not
at one time, or presently include what we call "religious ex
perience". Arguably, in one degree or another, all experi
ences that support the basis of religion are considered onto
logically to be of rnystical quality.iii It is the personal quality
of mystical experiences that will be explored in the pages
that follow.
The American philosopher and pragmatist, William
James, had significant thIngs to say regarding mystical ex
perience in his work TIle Varieties of Religious Experience
(VRE). In reference to the above discussion, he felt that the
moving force behind religion was not found in the creeds,
dogmas or elaborate descriptions of religions, but:
/I
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What keeps religion going is something [... ] [other]
than abstract definitions and systems of concate
nated adjectives, and something different from fac- .
ulties of theology [... ]. These things are the after
effects, secondary accretions upon those phenom
ena of vital conversation with the unseen divine
1...] renewing themselves [... J in the lives of hurn
bIe private men (VRE 487).
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What he means here is that these "secondary things" are
dependent upon this dialogical connection that, as he defines
it, happens in a mystical experience.
Looking at his epistemology in general will be im
portant to gain the proper understanding of mystical ex
perience in Varieties. In this essay, I first trace this epistemo
logical development in the later works of Pragmatism (P)
and the posthumously published Essays of Radical Empiri
cism (ERE). Then, I examine whether he remains consistent
after applying the findings from his epistelTIology to the
metaphysical dimension he holds of religious experience.
Finally, after leaving behind James's idea that religious ex
perience remains only authoritative for the individual, I
will defend my position that this does not entail mystical
experience is less verifiable and applicable to a collective
whole. From comparisons of our own and others' religious
experiences and th.e role of cognitive feeling within them,
this may be a case of what I term "pluralistic knowledge"
an intersubjective knowledge that makes a practical differ
ence to more than one individual's life. SOlne ideas from
contemporary philosophers Richard Rorty and Bruce Wil
shire will help illuminate the details of cognitive feeling,
and the social community that this pluralism depends on.
I: An Inherited Religious Tendency

Who was !:his man William James, and why as a
pragmatist, was he concerned with religion? Th.e innova
tion he brought regarding pragmatism was to see it as a
method applied to moral, metaphYSical and religiousprob
lems regarding uses of truth and value, rather than just a
method of scientific inquiry into the meaning of ideas. The
first American pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, embod
ied the latter idea in his pragmatism, and became put off by
the ideas of James, and henceforth diverged from James
calling his own pragmatism, "pragmaticism" - a name he
said was ugly enough [... ] to be safe from kidnap
/I
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pers" (Thayer 88). In James's work Pragmatism, he describes
the results of this wider inquiry as freeing us from abstrac
tion and insufficiency, from fixed principles, closed sys
tems, and pretended absolutes and origins" (51).
Throughout James's early life, he struggled with the
notion that human thought and action was determined, and
humans might be thus forced to act mechanically in a
closed universe (Thayer 133). His father, Henry James was
a religious man, having studied extensively at Princeton
Theological Seminary, and he instilled in James a democ
ratic way of viewing religious impulses (VRE v). Later in
life, James fulfilled a promise to his father that someday he
would deal critically with the issue of religion by writing
the comprehensive work The Varieties ofReligious Experience,
where the focus of religion would be placed not on the ob
ject (Le., God), but on the subject as an experiencing, believ
ing, doubting, and praying person (VRE vii).
Although James did not consider himself to be a di
reet participant in mystical experience,lv he says in a letter
to a friend that his purpose in writing the Varieties was to
show the glue holding the world's religious life together.
Furthermore, he wanted to show that the function of the life
(Le., those things found within the religious experiences) of
religion was mankind's most important oneY So how did
James define mystical experience, and what did experience
mean to him in general? These two components of his epis
temology must be explored.
1/

II: Experience: Mystical and Mundane
For James l there are four qualities that accompany
mystical experiencevi and the resulting conditions he placed
on these experiences. The first quality is ineffability; that is,
it "defies expression" and a wholly adequate articulation is
impossible. Second, it is noetic, or a state of knowledge, and
we gain things from this experience. A third is transiency
the experience does not last long, but passes away quickly.
FinallYI it is passive, or the feeling of union where one is ac
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tually "grasped" or "held" by a superior power. The condi
tion James places on mystical experience is its authority for
only those individuals who have it (VRE 414-15).
In SOlne of James's later works, the mindset he used
to view experience and what he termed" experiences" un
folds for us. In radical empiricism, James explainS experi
ences within the flux of time as being within "a world of
pure experience./I This world of pure experience is a world
of "pure objects" in which things can only be identified as a
that" or a " datum, fact, phenomenon, or con
tent" (McDermott 227). In order for an object (say, a book)
to be classified as more than a "that," but also as "physical"
or a percept" of something else it must have a function
(i.e., it can be read). When a particular object (the book)
within experience is seen with and then obscured from the
eyes, it can be thought of as "having been," or existing in
past experiences and is thus a percept. In addition to this,
taken in totality, my experiencing the book is what it is "to
be conscious of something" .vii
Thus, James shows us in the world of pure experi
ence, objects have three ontological states. First, they have
their pure" form, or "as they are" and can be referred to
only as a "that" and without content. Secondly, as things
move within space and time, they become divided into
what they have been, are, and will be.vii Finally, these rela
tions are conscious, given they are inseparable from the cog
nitive element of experience, and that acquisition of a con
scious quality depends upon its having a context.
Given these examples and analyses, the tendency for
Jmnes to emphasize the cognitive relation connecting things
within experience should be evident, and that in cases
where there are cognitive relations, these are as much ex
periences as the objects that they connect.i X Carrying the
cognitive aspect of radical empiricism further, one may
claim the importance of the personal feeling that gives mys
tical experience its individual quality.x In any event, the is
sue raised here by James's radical empiricism concerns the
subjectivity of experience. This arises because the subjective
/I
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qualities of these experiences are inevitably determined by
the limitations of that particular person's perceptions and
sensations.
Similarly, James mentions repeatedly the importance
of cognitive states in his Pragmatism lectures. The cognitive
function of feeling arises when things are evaluated by their
cash-value", or by the practical difference they make.
Things are useful to us insofar as we value them. This use
ful value is determined by what our belief (i.e., the response
to our feelings) about these things may entail.xi Cognition is
defined as the action or faculty of knowing taken in its wid
est sense, including sensation, perception, memory and
judgment. In Pragmatism, James uses an example of being
lost and starving in the woods, and seeing a cow-path. It is
reasonable, he says, to believe that there may be some hu
man habitation beyond the path, for this may mean saving
oneself from starvation. Thus, the inclinations given to this
experience by sensations with the eyes had great implica
tions for one's life and future well being: namely, the practi
cal relevance of believing there is a human habitation be
yond that path (P 93-5). We can see for ourselves that this
feeling, or impulse to act on our belief would have implica
tions important to our life, even though we would only be
acting on the probability that there was something beyond
that path. James elaborates on implications of individual
belief somewhat further:
1/

If there be any life better we should lead, and if

there be any idea which, if believed in, would help
us to lead that life, then it would be really better for
us to believe in that idea, unless indeed, belief in it
incidentally clashed with other greater vital bene
fits (37).
Thus, the significance placed on individual belief, es
pecially in religious tone, cannot be separated from the cog
nition of sensuous experience. It is therefore not unruly for
James to say that "pragmatism, so far from keeping her
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eyes bent on the immediate practical foreground, [... ]
dwells just as much upon the world's remotest perspec
tives" (56).
Note he is willing to include religious experience, yet
in a tone that is not monistic in quality. xii The religious plural
ism he wants to account for is an open-ended system; one guided
by empirically verified hypotheses (73-4). Even more so, in reli
gious life the notion holds true that:
We can and we may, as it were, jump with both feet
off the ground into or towards a world of which we
trust the other parts to meet our jump - and only so
can the making of a perfected world of the plural
istic pattern ever take place (McDermott 740).
Thus, the full experience for James consists in intri
cate cognitive connections that present the world as mostly
unified or held together by the plurality of experiences of
others, as well as our own.

III: Empirical Verification Applied to Mystical Experience
With these things in mind, I would like to sugges t
the'lt James's epistemological development seems to sh.ow,
prima jacie, a consistent residue from his earlier account of
religious experience in Varieties. xiii However, he fails to re
main consistent when holding that the metaphysics of mys
tical experience are only possibly verifiable by scientific
methods because this assumption goes beyond his praglna
tism, given he holds the practical benefits of mystical ex
perience are private, and carmot be shared to a community.
I would like to show that his view of religion has more
similarities to radical empiricism by looking into his con
cept of quasi-chaos" and then seeing the working cogni
tive aspect within experience which allows us to know and
identify mystical experiences of others. These are isstles I .
will return to later in my discussion of pluralistic knowl
edge.
II
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In both Pragmatism and Varieties James insists that the
value placed upon religious mystical experience is not only
real but also true for those who have them, and are a possi~
bility for greater truths beyond current scientifically verified
empirical data. Regarding scientific knowledge, he asks us,
why not think that perhaps our own, or others' mystical ex
periences are not the beginning of a transition" in the total
human experience? It is likely that what James really meant
by saying mystical experience was potentially scientifically
verifiable, was that it could be evidence providing insight
into new knowledge thafs becoming more scientifically
verifiable", but not necessarily "verified" at this point in
time.
Where I diverge from James is the point at which he
discusses another problem with the scientific verification of
mystical experiences, saying that science tends to focus
more on creating "entities" or universal laws" that will
work regardless of situation, or personal feeling. James
rnight be trying to a void an appeal to the monism of scien
tific rationalism here, or that a particular religious union
with a greater power will make an immediate practical dif
ference in more than one person s life. The latter conception
is impossible, because mystical experiences for James are
fundamentally subjective, and authoritative only for that
individuaL My disagreement is that two or more person's
"knowledge" about mystical experiences of others might
not require their being verifiable and arguable-and this is
contrary to science.
He seems unaware of having set up the case here, by
his naming it the "science of religions", for a knowledge
one can immediately obtain from such experiences that
should not be ignored since it has a possibility of being even
tually verified. With this in mind, those who have not had
mystical experiences should be able to grant from the ac
counts of oth.ers their possible verification; and this at least
provides them a general knowledge that such experiences
indeed do exist" and are out there to be evaluated as
11
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such. This now brings me to the notion of "pluralistic
knowledge".
IV: Pluralistic Knowledge

It has been mentioned early on that, in stepping away
from James's position regarding mystical experience, I
wished to amplify what I call "pluralistic knowledge". I
will begin by first examining, in order, James's concept
quasi-chaos", degrees of mystical knowledge, and the in~
separable emotive and cognitive elements of mystical ex~
periencei finally I will discuss the pragmatic value of this
knowledge. Although this notion may become clearer by
sketching these things throughout the following pages, I
continue to hold with James that mystical experience is val~
ued in society, but I think he failed to see this value is not
dependent on its scientific verification.xiv
The concept involved in quasi-chaos"xv is that an in~
dividual may undergo an experience leading to an event X,
while another may have an experience and also be led to X.
However, the first individual may have employed meth
ods, or experienced feelings of A and B to get to X, while
the second employed or experienced C and D. So in short,
differing paths may sometimes lead people to experience
the same event. Hence, given the variety of experiences that
are mystical throughout differing cultures and religions,
this supports the claim that "there is vastly more
[perceptual] discontinuity in the sum total of experience
than we commonly suppose" (McDermott 204).
If one claims to know something about an experience,
it is assumed they must have knowledge of that experien
tial content- either from their own experience, or of (m
other individual's experience. But according to James's
"quasi-chaos", we can have different experiences that lead to
the same event. In mystical experience the abstract object
(such as God)
what my experience "points to". Con
versely, my cognitive awareness, feel:i:ngs, thoughts, atti
tude of the object, and sense of self to whom that attitude
N
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belongs are what my experience consists of (VRE 542-3).
The experiential events termed quasi-chaos" must there
fore include supersensible or mystical experiences, and by
doing so take into account a whole system of experience.
Mystical experiences are real, sensible, and plural according
to his notion of quasi-chaos" .
It was mentioned above that in order to know some
thing, usually one must have knowledge of that subject's
content.xvi The noetic quality in mystical experience th.ere
fore is the awareness of the content of that experience.
However, if we recall a principle from radical empiricism,
an object has no content unless we are made conscious" by
our recognition of it in continuous transition. In order for
pluralistic knowledge to work here, the content must be
made intersubjectively explicit to a group of individuals.
From the concept of "quasi-chaos", we can have different
experiences leading to the same event, so it's plausible to
claim that our individual mystical experiences can differ,
but not necessarily the object to which they refer (and they
won't differ greatly, assuming the object(s) in mystical ex
perience are all supersensible).
Now, it seems obvious that if I have had a mystical
experience, I needn't argue with myself whether J know the
content of that experience. However, the problem for plu
ralistic knowledge is how I can identify another as having
had a valid mystical experience. How can t without being
aware of the content they alone have, identify it as mysti
cal? I would like to suggest that the solution to this problem.
lies in the inherent cognitive feeling within mystical experi
ence. We all know what it is to be conscious of something,
and moreover, we know what it is to have a sensation, or
emotional feeling for something, or for some object. It
seems that the only condition for identifying what another
knows; is to have knowledge of the content. But thejullnl!ss
of that content one must have is not generally made an is
sue. xvii With this point the definition of IImystical" can be
broadened to relate to knowledge, of any degree, of what
may be mystical, as a criterion for identifying whether an
/I
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other's experience was a mystical experience. Thus, because
a mystical experience involves a cognitive feeling to'wards
an object, it is plausible that everyone may possess the abil
itv to identify \vhether another's experience was mysti
cal.x\·iii

Hmvever, since I may only have a small degree of the
content to identify this experience as mystical, I cannot un
derstand either the full sensibility of the other's experience
or totalll1 understand the ineffability of that mystical experi
~nce. In order for mystical experiences to be called
"scientific" they would need to be fully describable, meas
urable, and also repeatable (much as an experiment-Le.,
not transient). This is where I think James missed a funda
mental point underlying mystical experiences: If they are
currently not scientific, this doesn't imply that they can't be
an intersubjectively knowable experience at least to a cer
tain degree. Gathering from what we have seen above, an
experience needn't be fully explicit to everyone to be
known to others, and these religious experiences can still
exist in a community in which they are known. The plural
istic knowledge here is an intersubjective understanding of
each other's possession of differing ways or paths of experi
ence to a supersensible object.
Pluralistic knowledge can also be understood by its
similarities to the inseparable emotive and cognitive func
tions from common phenomena in daily life that are inar
guable in much the same way as I am claiming mystical ex
periences can be. For example, one may not be able to de
scribe or provide inferential reasons of their love for a hus
band, wife, or family, but this does not mean that those ac
quainted with them would deny the existence of this love.
The concept of "being in love" in general (with God, a per
son, etc.) may be incapable of description in terms of the
character or actions of the beloved people or objects. Even
more so, one would not undermine a child's love for their
pet dog, an unconditional love for an imperfect person, or
philanthropic desire to help others as unwarranted because
of its ineffability. An insightful philosopher regarding this,
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Richard Rorty, writes:
It does not greatly matter whether we state our rea

son to believe-our insistence that some or all finite
mortal humans can be far more than they have yet
become - -in religious, political, philosophical, liter
ary, sexual, or familial terms. What matters [most]
is [ ... ] the ability to experience overpowering hope Dr
faith Dr love (Cambridge 97, italics mine).

What Rorty is trying to suggest is that experiences we
have may go beyond argument. He says later this may be
because we presently have no way of describing them. This
doesn't imply however, that they are not real to us or know
able to others. More importantly, he stresses the insistence
we have to believe our experiences are real that allows us to
move forward in the flux of experience- to become what
we are not yet-and, on my view, mystical experience is
not excluded from this.
Some pragmatic implications for such an acceptance
of mystical experience are found in the possibility of hope
and improvement of the quality of life, and the source of
sllch possibilities for James is a supersensible realm of new
experience. Although participating in someone else's mysti
cal experience is impossible, sharing notes" with others
about our own experiences cannot provide but a pluralistic
way to help us understand better the supersensible reality
we ourselves may have hope in. This interaction with oth
ers in a community is vital to the sharing and growing of
religious hope and a faith in what lies beyond this life.
Pragmatically considered, here we find the heart of plural
istic knowledge as applied to mystical experience. In an
other place, Rorty says:
/J

A religious faith which seems to lie behind the at
tractions of both utilitarianism and pragmatism is,
instead, a faith in the future possibilities of mortal
humans, a faith which is hard to distinguish from
love for, and hope for, the human community (96).
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This love, hope, and faith in the efforts of the human
community
. are what Rortv
. terms "romance" -a romance
underlining the notion that a pluralistic knowledge among
individuals may
crystallize around a congregation,
around a novel as easily as around a sacrament, around a
God as easily as around a child (96).
50 in essence a romantic attitude" can help us un
derstand the importance of a kno'wledge that is pluralistic
in nature, yet binds humanity by the fact that our individ
ual experiences have value applicable to the whole human
enterprise. A social quality like this is, after alt the primary
benefit of an anti-foundationalist epistemology that rejects
all ready-made absolutes. This is further supported by an
observation of James scholar Bruce Wilshire. He writes that
1/[ ••. ] our experiencing is not completely private. To a great
extent it is experienceable by others, and their experiencing
infiltrates (sometimes floods) ours" (Cambridge 120).
fI [ • • • ]

It

Moreover, in reminiscence of James's lifelong sh'ug
gles with determinism, I think he would have agreed with
'\Nilshire here that there is a need for recognition of the role
of pluralistic or publicly attained knowledgei and also
'when Wilshire continues to say that human viewpoints of
the world are determined largely because as social crea
tures, "[... ] thinking beings that get constituted within an
experienceable world [... ] experience others experiencing
them as experienced and experienceable (10). Perhaps it is
not James's intelligence, but rather his human temporality
that prevented him from furthering his philosophical per
spectives to rest upon a view of pluralistic knowledge.
V: Conclusion
In tracing James's radical empiricist and pragmatist
views in the course of this paper, I have tried to show the
implications of these views when applied to mystical ex
perience in Varieties. These implications have proven not so
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clear-cut! however, given the complexities of James!s mean
ing of experience. Nonetheless! I have maintained that al
though James holds mystical experience compatible vdth
eventual verification on scientific grounds, he did not see
clearly enough that our knowledge from mystical states can
currently be widened by dependence on humanity's collec
tive effort of sharing knowledge and constant deliberation.
IIPluralistic knowledge is the term I have used to
represent this collective effort of experiencing and intersub
jectively identifying to one another the mutual relations of
cognitive feeling inherent in all mystical experiences. In do
ing this! we can pragmatically benefit by increasing our
own knowledge of the supersensible by becoming con
scious of that of other's.
Moreover, with both a Jamesian-eye view, and from
Rortis clever suggestion! the undertaking of a romantic
attitude towards pluralism allows us to see that mystical
experience is valuable to humanity as a whole. I have
hoped to show this as the result of acknowledging plural
istic knowledge. Finally, with the suggestions of Wilshire,
and James! s concern to incorporate his own strong reserva
tions about determinism into his philosophy, we can see
clearly that the pragmatic value and meaning of James!s
reflections are worth bearing in mind.
ll

/I
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Notes

Contributor to this topic, Professor Ellen Kappy Suckiel of Notre Dame
writes "r [... J begin with the modest and uncontroversial claim that a
great many human beings have experienced feelings such as religious
awe and wonder, and that having such feelings is an entirely normal
mode of response. 1I from "The Cognitive Value of Feelings", in Heavens

i

Champion William James's Philosophy afReligion, p.73.
I am borrowing the Deweyan distinction between "religion" and the
"religious". According to Dewey, "Religion always signifies a special body of
beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or
tight. The adjective religious denotes nothing ill the way of a specifiable entity,
either institutional or as a system of beliefs. [Furthermore, this adjective] does
not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a
particular or distinctive foml of existence", from "Religion Versus the
ii

58

BRITTANY

G. TRICE

Religious", in A Common Faith. John Dewey (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1933), pp. 9-10, italics mine.
iii In this paper, I will assume the most basic function underlying all
religions is mystical states. Therefore, when I say something is a
mystical experience, it should be kept in mind that this function is
common to religious experience in a variety of religions. Thus,
combining this with the aforementioned definition of 11 mystical" - a
religious experience can indeed be "mystical", but at the same time, it
does not hold to say all mystical experiences are of a religion.
iv "Whether my treahnent of mystical states will shed more light or
darkness, I do not know, for my own constitution shuts me out from
their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at second
hand" (VRE 413).
v "[In preparing the Varieties], the problem I have set myself is a hard
one: first, to defend (against all prejudices of my c1asstexperience" and
"philosophy" as being the real backbone of the world's religious life - I
mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and
privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny
and the world's meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader
believe, as I myself do invincibly believe, that, although all the special
manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and
theories), [... ] the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important
function. A task well-nigh impossible, [... ] but to attempt it is tny
religious act." From Lellers ofWilliam James, Vol II, p. 127. To Miss
Frances R. Morse.
vi I should like to distinguish for purposes of this essay that there) llre
two lJ{lsic types of mystical religious experience. First is the COllll1IU/Ull
type, a form common in Christianity. In this experience we reel there if;
a providential God about us that hears our prnyers, and works with tiS
continually in our life. Second, and the type which will be discussed in
this essay, there is the kind that involves a union with the divine, and is
perhaps so powerful that one loses all self-identity. This latter type is
the one that James focuses on most in his Varieties. For a more elaborate
expansion on this distinction of "communal" and "union" mystical
experience, see David Stewart's "Mystical Experience", in Exploring the
Philosophy afReligion. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992) pp.S-9.
vii This conscious relation is further advanced by his idea that" the
relations of continuous transition experienced are what make Ollt'
experiences cognitive" (WJ 213, italics mine).
viii Perhaps James draws this description of reality from influences by
Peirce and his theory of probability that deals with the pragmatic
maxim and its applications to hardness, weight, force, and reality in his
essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." More specifically, Peirce writes:
"the will be's, the actually is's, and the have beens are not the sun, of the
reals. They only cover actuality. They me besides would be's and can be's
that are real", in H.S. Thayer's Meaning and Action: A Critical History of
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Pragmatism (Babbs-Merrill: Indianapo~is and New York, 1968) p.114.
"The relations that connect experiences must themselves be
experienced relations, and any kind of relation must be accounted as
'real' as anything else in the system." From A World of Pure Experience
(WJ195). Also in another place, "Experience as a whole is a process in
time, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded
by others that follow upon them by transitions which, whether
disjunctive or conjunctive in content, are themselves experiences, and
must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms which they
relate" (McDermott 202).
x As a rule, mystical states merely add a supersensLlous meaning to the
ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the
emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts
already objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a
new connection with our active life." (VRE 466)
,i A similar passage in Varieties reads: "Both thought and feeling are
determinants of conduct, and the same may be determined either by
feeling or by thought" (VRE 548).
xii Although in Varieties he
that mystical states of religious
experience encourage monistic tendencies, James thinks that this is
unfortunate. The probl~m he sees with monism is its "fixed" and
"static" nature that will not accept a "cholera-germ" of imperfection in
its water-tank. However, because the idea of monism encourages the
notion that we have already "reached the end" of inquiry, it cannot
provide a sufficient account of experience in totality, given thl! "flux" Df
knowledge is in constant transition.
Thus, pragmatism rejects absolute monism (1' 74), and openly embracml
pluralism, because "for men in practical life, perfection is still something far
off and in the process of achievement" (P 16) We mllst take (l mdioristic
approach to knowledge; that is, accepting that our current beliefs are open
to falsification, and that reformulation of them inevitably results in new
ideas intertwined and tainted with hints of the old.
xiii It should be noted that James held Pragmatism and Radical Empiri
cism to be separate doctrines (McDern1ott 314). But I am emphasizing
the most pertinent threads in both so as to give light to discussion of
what he meant by mystical experience, and set ttp the case for amplify
ing his views in what I am going to call "pluralistic knowledge",
xlv The subjective and pluralistic characteristics inherent to mystical
experience may be reason too, why Peirce (who wasmnthematically
and scientifically inclined) chose to leave the psychological find
emotional elements out of his pragmatism, and perhaps why he
responded to James negatively.
xv "111e whole system of experience as they are immediately given presents
itself as a quasi-chaos thmugh which one can pass out of an inilial tenn in
many directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from next to
next by a gl'eat many possible paths" (McDermott 204).
ix
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There is also an interesting and rather long example of this type of
pluralism in the New Testament regarding the church body: "TI1e body
is a unit, though it is made up of many parts; and though all its parts
are many, they form one body. [... J lithe foot should say, because I am
not a hand, I do not belong to the body, it would not for that reason
cease to be a part of the body. If the whole body were an eye, where
would the sense of hearing be? If the whole body were an ear, where
would the sense of smell be? But in fact God has arranged the parts in
the body, everyone of them, just as he wanted them to be." I
Corinthians 12:12-20 (NIV).
On another note, in Hindu scripture an interesting pluralism is
found with the creation of the caste system and where the making of
humanity is presented. The particular passage that follows formed the
basis and foundational authority for the Hindu caste system: "When
they [the gods] divided the Man, into how many parts did they
apportion him? What do they call his two arms and thighs and feet?
His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior,
his thighs the People, and from his feet the Servants were born": Rig
Veda 10.90.
xvi Although how we ever became aware of the content of a subject in
the first place has been problematic from the beginning of western
philosophy. In Plato's Mella this paradox states that we cannot seek
what we know because we already know it, and thus do not need to
seek for it; and we cannot search for what we do not know without
some criterion to identify the thing with. I do not wish to solve this
dilemma in my essay however, but assume that we are able to get past
this stage somehow in knowledge, and I think this claim is inductively
plausible. Ed. John M. Cooper, from Meno, in Plato's Complete Works
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997) 80D-E.
xvii The problem of whether one can know that either they or another
possess knowledge of something with only second order knowledge
(Le., knowledge-of-knowledge, as opposed to first order, or knowledge
of the content) is dealt with extensively by Plato in his Channides. I
agree with Plato scholar Charles H. Kahn, that having "knowledge-of"
something implies we have a degree of the content, and hence, second
order knowledge is a degree of first order knowledge. He argues,
"Without knowing quantum mechanics I can know enough about
quantum mechanics to know that I am ignorant of it. Of course I must
know something about it besides the name, or I could not be sure of my
ignorance; I cannot be wholly ignorant of the subject./I From
"Charmides ffil.d The Search for Beneficial Knowledge", in Plato and The
Socratic Dialogue (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
pp.198-99.
xviii I am broadening James's definition of "mystical" a bit, but my goal
is to try and show the similarities of feelings to any object, to feelings
towards a supersensible object. This is something I feel James
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unwarrantedly neglected. In doing so, I hope to show that even if one
claims to not have had an experience called mystical- they may avoid a
horn in the dilemma of Meno's paradox because they do already know
how to identify another's mystical experience because they already
have a small degree of the content of it.
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